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Abstract
The social and economic developments in European countries have put pressure on
their national budgets and threaten the sustainability of public policies. The tradi-
tional fiscal indicators, specifically, the deficit and the debt, which are still used
today as guiding tools, have proved to be insufficient, due to their arbitrary nature
and short-term focus. In this paper, we resort to an alternative fiscal indicator, known
as ‘generational accounting’, which is able to incorporate the future changes in the
demographic structure of the population, and their corresponding impact on public
accounts. It is also able to evaluate how current fiscal policy affects, not only, cur-
rent generations, but also future generations. We apply this methodology to assess the
long-term fiscal situation of Portugal, and compare the results with those obtained in
1999. In this context, we also explore additional scenarios, as well as additional indi-
cators, in order to provide some robustness to our findings. Our results show that, if
the current fiscal policy is not significantly changed, future generations will face a
much heavier fiscal burden than current generations.
Keywords Generational accounting · Fiscal sustainability · Intergenerational
distribution · Overlapping generations · Net tax payments · Public accounts
JEL Classification H20 · H50 · H60 · I31 · J11 · J18 · J21 · J31
1 Introduction
In recent years, the stability of public finances in European countries has been under
pressure. Among the causes of this instability are the slowing of economic growth,
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and the ageing of the population. With lower economic growth, on a macroeconomic
level, the economies will generate fewer resources, and governments will have a
smaller base from which they are able to collect revenues. On a microeconomic level,
fewer jobs will be created, implying that some agents will not find placement in the
job market, and, therefore, will, not only, be unable to contribute to public budgets,
but will also increase dependency on public resources, through unemployment bene-
fits. The ageing of the population poses a problem for two reasons. On the one hand,
a reduction of the working population, and on the other hand, an increase in age-
ing related costs, namely, on pension systems and healthcare. If we look at society
as being composed by three major age groups according to the life cycle (child-
hood/youth, middle-aged/active, and elderly/retirement), both the elderly and youth
groups would be net beneficiaries (benefits received are higher than taxes paid) of
public budgets, while the middle-aged groups would, not only, be net contributors
of public budgets, but also have to contribute enough to off-set the spending with
the other 2 groups of net beneficiaries. Based on these arguments, it follows that the
structure of the population decisively affects the balance of public budgets.
The goal of this paper is to access the sustainability of the Portuguese fiscal sys-
tem in the long run, to measure the net tax burdens for current/living and future
generations (those that have not been born yet), and to propose corrective policies
in case of unsustainability or imbalances between the net tax payments of current
and future generations. Traditional fiscal measures, namely deficit and debt account-
ing, focus only on the current and short term effects of fiscal policies, and may not
accurately reflect government accounts, due to its arbitrary nature. Thus, we alterna-
tively resort to Generational Accounting, a methodology that was initially developed
by Auerbach et al. (1992, 1994 and 1999b), which is based on the government’s
intertemporal budget constraint, stating that present and future government spending
must either be covered by current or future taxes and social security contributions, or
by government net wealth. Depending on how they are financed, public policies have
to be paid either by current or future generations, affecting their net wealth, and, as
a consequence, they entail intergenerational distribution. Generational accounting is
able to incorporate these long term implications of fiscal policy on intragenerational
(within generations) and intergenerational (across generations) distribution and fis-
cal sustainability, while including future changes in the demographic structure of the
population.
To produce generational accounts, we require: projections of the population, taxes,
transfers, and government expenditures; an initial value of government wealth; a
growth rate and a discount rate. The analysis is forward-looking, and, therefore, it
calculates only the future fiscal burdens that each generation faces. The year 2010
is set as the base year, with generations born before or in 2010 considered as the
current generation, and generations born after 2010 considered as the future genera-
tions. Taxes and transfers are allocated to the population according to a micro-profile,
based on their age, in order to reflect changes in these variables due to changes in the
population’s demographic structure. The rest of the variables are assumed to evolve
at the same rate as the overall economy.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: First, the results obtained in this paper
are analyzed and compared to the results in “Generational Accounting around the
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World” by Auerbach et al. (1999b). In other words, we provide an update of the cal-
culations using the same methodology, so that we can draw conclusions from the
recent policies followed by Portugal in terms of the sustainability of fiscal policy,
and if further changes are required. We also provide a comparison with an alterna-
tive methodology for the calculations of the underlying accounts, by the European
National Transfer Accounts, and compare the potential advantages and disadvantages
between them. Then, we follow this initial analysis with calculations resorting to
additional indicators and different scenarios, which will allow us to overcome some
of the shortcomings of the initial indicators, provide additional insight on the change
of the results due to changes in different variables (including different allocation of
certain expenditures, changes in the discount rate or the productivity growth rate), as
well as the underlying causes for these changes.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 highlights some of the changes
in the Portuguese economy and demography that will affect the sustainability of the
fiscal system. Section 3 explains the relevance of the generational accounting method
in comparison to the traditional methods. Section 4 describes the theoretical frame-
work and the methodology of generational accounting, as well as some limitations
of these indicators. Section 5 defines the process of estimation of the variables and
parameters of the government’s intertemporal budget constraint. This includes pop-
ulation projections and developments; age specific micro-profiles in order to assign
taxes, social security and other contributions, transfers and benefits; fiscal data and
government accounts; and the choice for the growth and discount rates. Section 6
presents the applied data of generational accounting and the respective results, and
compares them with the results obtained in the accounts of 1999. We also provide
additional indicators, in order to overcome some of the shortcomings of the main
indicator. Section 7 provides a sensitivity analysis of the obtained results, as well as
some empirical limitations. Section 8 provides the conclusions of this paper.
2 Sustainability of Portugal’s fiscal system
The Portuguese economy has been characterized by lower economic growth and suc-
cessive current account deficits over the past years. As described by Pina and Abreu
(2013), the low interest rates provided an easier access to credit in international
markets. Given the decreasing levels of savings, consumption and investment were
financed through increasing levels of public, as well as private debt. The authors also
mention the bias of investment and credit towards sectors that provided non-tradable
goods and services, which, along with the rigidity of the labour market and the lack of
adjustment of wages to productivity, hindered the competitive position of the coun-
try and its ability to attract foreign investment. These factors generated a situation
of instability that became unsustainable with the global financial and sovereign debt
crises, due to the large decrease of external private financing. It led Portugal to sign
a three year European Union-International Monetary Fund (EU-IMF) program of
financial assistance in May 2011 until May 2014, implementing structural reforms
with the goal of balancing the budget and stabilizing public debt levels, as well as to
generate sustained and balanced growth. In this section, we give a brief description
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of some of the changes in the Portuguese economy and the demographic structure of
the country that are likely to affect the sustainability of the fiscal system.
2.1 Economic growth and public accounts
We start by analyzing economic growth, described in Fig. 1. As we can see, it reflects
a downard tendency, stabilizing between 0 and 2%, also in accordance with the ten-
dency of other European countries. Lower GDP growth rates tend to be associated
with higher pressure on public accounts, and the reason is simple: a lower GDP
growth rate will imply that the increase in the production of resources by an econ-
omy/country is lower. As a result, the taxes that fall upon those same resources will
also decrease, lowering public revenues. A lower GDP growth rate is also usually
associated with lower levels of employment, and the pressure on public accounts will
also come from higher unemployment and other public social safety net benefits pro-
vided. Indeed, we will see later on that, in our model, a lower economic growth rate
will lead to a higher pressure on public accounts, as well as a higher burden for future
generations.
We also need to take into account how the public finances have been developing,
and how they are likely to evolve in the future. Through the analysis of public expen-
diture (in % GDP), described in Fig. 2, we can see that, in the period of 1995 to 2010,
Portugal followed the trend of increase in public spending (even though with a con-
siderable lag), converging to the average of the euro area and the European Union.The
large increase in 2009 is in response to the international crisis by most member states
of the union, whether through automatic stabilizers, or through stabilization policies.
Nevertheless, as revenues were insufficient, Portugal accumulated fiscal deficits that
resulted in a growing public indebtedness. As described in the OECD (2019), in the
last two decades until the intervention program, the fiscal deficit never fell signifi-
cantly below 3% of GDP (see Fig. 3), which, combined with small economic growth,
resulted in a gradual but sustained rise in public debt since 2000 (see Fig. 4). In 2009,
the “debt increase” shifted to a much steeper path, reaching 130% of GDP in 2014.
Fig. 1 Portugal’s Annual GDP Growth (%). Source: World Development Indicators
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Fig. 2 Government Expenditures (% of GDP). Source: Eurostat, “General Government Expenditure and
main aggregates”
The combination of a rising public and external debt, slowing economic growth
and the instability that came with the international financial crisis, led to a loss of
confidence that Portugal would be able to fulfill its financial obligations, reflected
in the lack of access to long-term financing at sustainable rates, culminating in the
necessity of a financial assistance program signed with the European Union and the
International Monetary Fund (EU-IMF). The outcomes seem to be in line with the
goals of the program. Economic growth picked up, government expenditures dropped
(as we can see in Fig. 2), public deficit decreased, public debt got under control, and
is declining (as we can see in Fig. 4), and its outlook is now seen as acceptable by
the 4 main rating agencies. However, a closer analysis of Fig. 4 shows the fragility of
Fig. 3 Fiscal Indicators (% of GDP). Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Portugal 2012
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Fig. 4 General Government Debt (% of GDP). Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Portugal 2017
the current situation. An increase in the interest rates or the inflation rates can lead
the path of public debt back to unsustainability.
2.2 Population ageing
The next topic we will address in this section is population ageing, the changes in the
demographic structure, and the consequences for fiscal policy. Even though Portugal
(and other EU member states) are familiar with this concept, its consequences have
to be taken into account for policies that will affect future generations. Many policies
of the welfare state that provide citizens protection against risk (like social security),
were institutionalized in a much more thriving demographic environment, with a
younger population and with optimistic expectations of economic growth. However,
we are now witnessing an inversion of that same environment, with the continuous
fall in fertility rates, combined with the increase in life expectancy, as shown in Fig. 5
and Table 1, respectively.
Fig. 5 Total Fertility Rates (%). Source: Eurostat, “Fertility rates”
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Table 1 Life Expectancy in Portugal (in years)
2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
Life expectancy at birth (females) 82,2 82,6 83,8 84,0 84,3 84,6
Life expectancy at birth (males) 75,9 76,5 77,3 77,6 78,1 78,4
Healthy life years at birth (female) 57,8 56,4 58,6 62,2 55,0 57,0
Healthy life years at birth (male) 58,5 58,3 60,7 63,9 58,2 60,1
Source: Eurostat, “Healthy life year indicators”
The increasing life expectancy of individuals relates to economic activity in a pro-
gressively problematic way, where the benefits of the elderly are inversely adjusted
to the development of life expectancy. In these circumstances, old age ceases to
be a singular risk that social security prevented in the few terminal years of every
pensioner, substituting the earnings when the individual leaves the labor market def-
initely, and creating a new risk. This additional risk is associated with the possibility
of pension benefits being insufficient to guarantee a decent standard of living to
the beneficiary that faces new threats associated with longevity (mainly regarding
healthcare and the funding of those pensions). The risks associated with dependency
and with prolonged illness have a very significant effect in Portugal, as well as in
other developed countries. Until now, the socialization of these risks associated with
longevity has been low. The family solution has prevailed so far and the institu-
tionalization of the elderly in residential nursing homes works as a solution of last
resort, when the situations become too complicated to be managed inside the family.
However, the shift in family structures in the last decades has increased the num-
ber of people with no family support to help them against these risks, which will
lead to a higher demand of public long-term care services. The need of public pro-
tection against longevity risks is likely to increase even more in the future, given
the information provided in Table 1. Lastly, notice that, even though life expectancy
at birth has increased, there is not only, a huge difference when compared to the
healthy life years at birth indicator, but also a difference in the increase in years
between the two indicators, with healthy life years increasing at a lower rate than life
expectancy.
We also need to take into account the pressure of ageing on government bud-
gets and future generations. The evidence presented in Fig. 6 and Table 2, regarding
the development of public expenditures by function and old age dependency ratios,
respectively, reflects the increase of government expenditures associated with the
ageing phenomenon, as well as the burden that is going to fall on the working age
population, or to be covered by future generations. Even though the costs regarding
healthcare have been kept under control, as we can see from Fig. 6, it seems obvious
that social protection is the account that is putting more pressure on public finances,
and that this behavior is, mainly, due to old age related expenditures. While all other
accounts are always below 10% of GDP, government expenditures with social pro-
tection are always above 10%, steadily increasing and diverging from all the other
accounts, with 18,8% in 2012.
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Fig. 6 Government Expenditures (by function, in % GDP). Source: Eurostat, “Government Expenditures
by function”
Table 2 provides how old age dependency ratios changed overtime, as well as how
they are predicted to change in the future, and are a good indicator of the burden
that will fall upon current middle-aged/active and future generations.This indicator
reflects the number of elderly people (with 65 years or more) per 100 active/working
age people (with age between 15 and 64). Therefore, a higher dependency ratio
implies a higher “burden” on the working population with the expenditures of their
elderly. As we can see, the projected ratios for the future are quite alarming, with
more than 1 elderly per 2 people of working age. And the scenario may be even
worse, if we take into account that some of the people between 15 and 64 years may
be studying, unemployed or non-participating in the labor force.
Table 2 Old Age Dependency Ratios (by years)
Actual Projected
1985 18,2 2000 23,7 2007 26,3 2014 30,3 2040 55,6
1990 20,0 2001 24,2 2008 26,6 2015 31,1 2050 65,8
1995 22,0 2002 24,6 2009 27,0 2016 31,8 2060 66,3
1996 22,2 2003 24,9 2010 27,5 2017 32,5 2070 68,0
1997 22,6 2004 25,3 2011 28,2 2018 33,3 2080 69,4
1998 23,0 2005 25,7 2012 28,8 2020 34,5 2090 70,1
1999 23,4 2006 26,0 2013 29,4 2030 43,7 2100 70,4
Source: Eurostat, “Old Age dependency ratios”
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2.3 Intergenerational inequality
Lastly , in light of all the previous issues we raised in this section, it is also important
to refer to their impact on intergenerational equality (equality between different gen-
erations). Taking all into consideration, it is relatively simple to conclude that they
are very likely to increase generational inequality, and increase the burden for future
generations. In fact, this is a concern that not only affects Portugal, but many other
developed countries as well. The head of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, also expressed
concerns on this issue, in a conference in Davos, in January, 2018. In a presentation
titled “A Dream Deferred: Inequality and Poverty Across Generations in Europe”, the
IMF points out that, since the financial crisis, income inequality levels have been rel-
atively stable in European countries, but there is a significant growing gap between
the youth and the elderly income levels post-crisis. More specifically, they trace a
scenario with lower income levels, higher unemployment, more debt and higher risk
of poverty for younger and future generations: Incomes for young people have not
grown since the 2007 crisis, but they have increased by 10% for people at 65 or older
(pension protection); nearly one in five young people in Europe are still looking for
work, and when they find, it will likely be at lower wages and with lower security; and
the younger have the highest debt relative to their assets of any age group. Just like
the IMF, this topic was also addressed by the OECD (2017) in a press release, based
on a publication Preventing Ageing Unequally (2017), stating that future generations
will be largely affected by population ageing and rising inequality.
2.4 Current economic outlook
According to the OECD (2019), after the IMF intervention until today, the overall
economic situation of Portugal has improved remarkably: GDP growth is back to pre-
crisis levels, and is likely to maintain in coming years; unemployment rate has had
one of the largest declines of OECD countries in the last decade; public debt ratio is
falling; and the exports market has expanded. Despite this progress, the report also
expresses some concerns for future developments: public debt still remains one of the
highest across OECD countries, and limits the ability of public authorities to respond
to future shocks, like an increase in the interest rates (change in policy by the ECB);
a rapidly ageing population, which requires reforms on the pension and healthcare
systems; relatively low living standards when compared to other OECD countries,
with little convergence in the past decades; and a relatively high unemployment rate
for unskilled workers. National institutions have also expressed concerns on the sus-
tainability of government programs. This includes a study published by the Fundação
Francisco Manuel dos Santos on April of 2019 (more specifically, by Moreira et al.
(2019)), which establishes that social security will start generating chronic deficits
by 2027.
Summing up, with an ageing population and the number of beneficiaries of public
budgets growing more than contributors, the distributive needs will keep increas-
ing, which will put more pressure on national budgets. However, Portugal’s public
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finances are already under pressure, and even though the overall economic and
financial outlook is improving, public debt is still far from assured sustainability.
3 Deficit and debt as a not well-definedmeasure
In general, policy and decision makers take traditional fiscal measures, specifically,
the deficit and the debt, as the main guiding tools in fiscal policy. Take, for example,
the target defined for public deficits at 3% of GDP or less for the countries in the
European Monetary Union. The main concerns with debt and deficit accounting are
their arbitrary nature, and their focus on the current and short run effects of fiscal
policies. In this section, we will explore the arbitrary nature of these measures in
more detail.
Government expenditures and revenues, as well as the level of public debt, are
published in annual government budgets and, therefore, capture the short-run effects
of fiscal policy. This implies that a change of policy in a given year that yields an
impact throughout many years in the future (or for more than one year, at least), may
bear the risk of only being associated with its short-run effects (given by the budget
of that same year), while its effects for the other years are going to be incorporated
in those yearly budgets and may be disassociated with that specific policy. If agents
are rational and forward looking, they will consider the impacts of fiscal policy on
their lifetime budget constraint, and will readjust their consumption and savings level
according to the new policy. It is very unlikely that an annual government budget
will be able to capture the whole effect of these changes, especially if they affect
generations born in the future. Therefore, it is important to measure the effects of
fiscal policy in the long-run, as it may affect the life cycle resources of current and
future generations, by redistributing resources among them.
As established in Auerbach et al. (1999b), the arbitrary nature of these measures
relies on the fact that they depend on how different governments or different countries
choose to define their expenditures and their revenues. Governments can conduct
any sustainable fiscal policy, and, at the same time, choose its accounting so as to
report any surplus or deficit that they want. They are able to enact policies with huge
intergenerational redistributive fiscal effects while reporting a “balanced budget”; or
enact apparently identical fiscal policies with dramatically different time paths of
reported deficits. However, the way governments choose to define their revenues and
expenditures should be irrelevant for actual fiscal policy, since the economic effects
of the fiscal policy followed will not depend in any way on the accounting labels
chosen.
We demonstrate these concerns with an example described in Raffelhüschen and
Walliser (1999). In this example, we consider a model of two generations (young
and old), that only live for two periods, and where there is no government activity
before period 0. It is also assumed that the interest rate is constant at 20% and that
population growth is also constant at 10%. The main goal of this exercise is to eval-
uate the impact of four different fiscal policies on government budgets, taking into
account their potential intergenerational redistribution effects, and to show how easy
it is to manipulate deficit/debt values to show the same value for policies that entail
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different intergenerational effects, or have them show different values for policies
with the same intergenerational effects. A summary of the different policies is shown
in Table 3.
In scenario (a), there is a transfer of 100 units granted to the young generation in
the first period, which is only paid for by that same generation in the next period. So,
in period 0, there is an expenditure of 100 units that is not paid and, as a result, the
budget deficit and government debt are also of 100 units in this period. In the next
period (period 1), the now old generation has to cover the transfer that it has received
in the previous period, so it pays taxes of 120 units, which is equal to the 100 units
of transfer received in period 0, plus 20 units of interest payments on the public debt.
If the policy is maintained in period 1, the young generation from period 1 receives
110 units, which increase from 100 units in period 0 due to population growth of
10%. In period 1, the government collects taxes of 120 units, and has expenditures
with, not only of 110 units in transfers, but also of 20 units in interest payments,
amounting to a total of 130 units. Thus, the deficit in period 1 will be of 10 units,
and the government debt will accumulate to 110 units. If this policy is maintained
for future periods, we can see that both government deficit and debt will grow at the
same rate as the population.
In scenario (b), the policy is the institution of a tax-financed pension system, in
which generations will discount for their own pensions through the payment of taxes
when they are young, and receive the pension benefits in the following period, when
they are old. If this policy starts in period 0, the government will report a surplus and
Table 3 Analysis of different policies with traditional fiscal indicators (r=20% and g=10%)
Period Old generation Interest Young generation Deficit Debt
Scenario (a)
0 0 0 100 100 100
1 −120 20 110 10 110
2 −132 22 121 11 121
Scenario (b)
0 0 0 −100 −100 −100
1 120 −20 −110 −10 −110
2 132 −22 −121 −11 −121
Scenario (c)
0 0 0 100 0 0
1 120 20 110 0 0
2 132 22 121 0 0
Scenario (d)
0 100 0 −100 0 0
1 110 0 -110 0 0
2 121 0 −121 0 0
Source: Raffelhüschen and Walliser (1999)
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net wealth of 100 units, since young generations of this period will be taxed in 100
units, and old generations of this period will not receive any amount, since they have
not discounted in the previous period. In period 1, the government has to pay 120
units to the old generation (100 units taxed in the previous period plus interest), and
amounts revenues of 20 units, from the interest on accumulated wealth in the previous
period, plus 110 units in taxes from the young generations, which increased from 100
units in the previous period due to the population growth. Therefore, the surplus in
period 1 is of 10 units and net wealth is of 110 units, and both these accounts will
grow at the rate of the population if the policy is maintained.
We now turn to scenario (c), which is identical to scenario (b), but with one differ-
ence: the payments made by the young generations are classified as loans, which the
government invests on the capital market. This implies that the amount collected from
the young generations in each period does not classify as government revenue, and it
will report a balanced budget and no debt in period 0. In period 1, if we assume per-
fect capital markets, the amount invested in period 0 (100 units) will yield a return of
20%, which is the defined interest rate. The interest receipts plus the amount invested
will be enough to cover the debt to the now old generation of period 1 (loan granted
plus interests). If this policy is maintained, both the loans from the young genera-
tion, and the respective debt payments in the following periods grow at the same rate
as the population. However, in this case, government has a balanced budget in every
period and, hence, has no debt.
The last scenario (d) describes a policy that introduces a pay-as-you-go pension
system. Under this type of system, the transfers received by the old generation in
each period will equal the tax payments of the young generation of the same period.
Basically, young generations finance the transfers of the old generations of their own
period, expecting that the young generations in the next period will do the same for
them. In this case, both the taxes paid by young generations and the transfers received
by the old generations will grow at the same rate as the population. Also, taxes paid
and transfers received are the same in each period, the budget is always balanced and
the government debt is always equal to zero.
If we analyze all four policies using the traditional fiscal measures (deficit and
debt accounting), we conclude that: the policy enacted in scenario (b) achieves the
most satisfying results, increasing the amount of net wealth over the years; the policy
enacted in scenario (a) achieves the least satisfying results, increasing the amount
of government debt over the years; policies (c) and (d) have no effect on the public
budget and debt level, and are equivalent to one another.
However, if we analyze these policies in terms of intergenerational distribution,
and in terms of changes in the lifetime budget constraint, we conclude that, not only
are the first three policies identical, but also indifferent, since they do not present any
changes in terms of the present value of the net tax payments for each generation.
In each one of these policies, whether the generations are receiving first and paying
in the following period, or paying first and receiving in the following period, these
payments and transfers take into account the opportunity cost of money, given in this
example by the interest rate of 20%. In other words, the net present value of taxes
paid minus transfers received over the life cycle for each generation has not changed.
For that reason, rational agents do not have any incentive or reason to change their
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behavior with the policies described in scenarios (a), (b) or (c). We also conclude
that the policies described in scenarios (d) and (c) are not equivalent. In scenario (d),
the introduction of the pay-as-you-go system automatically increases the consump-
tion possibilities of the old generation in period 0 who did not contributed to the
system. This increase is financed by all other subsequent generations, who have their
consumption possibilities reduced, since their rate of return under the pay-as-you-go
system is equal to the population growth, which is lower than the interest rate.
4 Generational accounting - methodology
4.1 Underlyingmodel andmain indicators
As described in Auerbach et al. (1999b), fiscal policies have real effects, due to: 1
- shifting economic incentives, 2 – redistribution between private citizens and gov-
ernment, 3 – intragenerational redistribution (distribution within generations), or 4 –
intergenerational redistribution (distribution across generations). The authors provide
an alternative methodology to study these effects, called generational accounting,
which is based on the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, described in
Eq. 1. This equation establishes that the present value of the net tax payments (which
encompass taxes and contributions paid less social security, welfare, and other trans-
fer payments received) of current and future generations have to be enough to cover
the present value of government expenditures and the current level of net public debt.
In short, it requires either current or future generations to cover overall public spend-
ing. Since one of the goals is to assess how the fiscal burden is distributed among







Nt,k(1 + r)−(k−t) =
∞∑
s=t
Gs(1 + r)−(s−t) − Wgt (1)
As can be seen in Eq. 1, there are 4 main variables. Starting from left to right,
the first element consists of the sum of the generational accounts of current genera-
tions. The term Nt,k represents the net tax payments of the generation born in year k,
discounted to year t (the base year), and k goes from t – D (where D stands for the
maximum age, in the base year) to t (the generation born in the base year).The second
element of Eq. 1 represents the present value of the sum of the generational accounts
of future generations. It is important to point out that these two variables encompass
all the public revenues and expenditures that are directly dependent on the age struc-
ture of the population, and whose payments or benefits can be directly attributed to
the population according to their age.Therefore, the third element of Eq. 1 consists
of the present value of the sum of the net public expenditures (expenditures minus
revenues) that do not depend on the age structure of the population. This includes
government’s purchases of goods and services whose benefits are difficult to attribute
to specific generations. This implies two things: 1 – generational accounting only
tells us which generations will have to pay for the net public expenses defined by
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G, but it does not tell us which generation benefits from them, or how valuable or
beneficial they are; 2 – generational accounting is not able to completely show the
full net benefit or burden for each generation from fiscal policy as a whole, but it is
able to show the full net benefit or burden for a generation if there are changes from
fiscal policy affecting variables included in the net tax payments (taxes and trans-
fers), from all levels of government (federal, state, and local).The last element of
Eq. 1, Wgt , encompasses the government’s net wealth in year t (basically, the public
assets minus public debt). Finally, looking at Eq. 1 overall, we can identify a “zero
sum” characteristic for this intergenerational budget constraint. This implies that, for
example, given a certain level of government net wealth, an increase in the present
value of net public expenditures (third element of Eq. 1) requires an increase in the
present value of the generational accounts of either the current or future generations,
or a combination of both (first and second element of Eq. 1).
We now proceed to a more detailed analysis on how to estimate the generational
accounts, which follows a two-step process: 1 - Projecting the average taxes and
transfer payments of each living generation for each year in the future, during which,
at least, some members of the current generation will be alive; 2 – Taking the pro-
jections estimated in the first step, and discounting them to the base year, and also
taking into account the probability of the people from each generation to be alive in









where λ=máx(t,k). The Ts,k variable stands for the net tax payments that are expected
to be paid in year s by an average person of the generation born in year k. This can be
better described by Eq. 3, where hs,k,i stands for the average tax (if h > 0) or average
transfer (if h < 0) of type i paid or received, respectively, in year s by an average
person born in year k. The term Ps,k stands for the expected number of people who
were born in year k and are still alive in year s. Notice that Eq. 2 is defined for the
members of the current generation that were born before or after the base year, but we
only take into account the net tax payments after the base year, discounted according
to the year which they were made, on a present value base analysis. For the people
born before year t, the sum begins in year t and is discounted to year t (this analysis
is forward looking, so we don’t take into account the net taxes already paid prior to
the base year). For the people born in year k > t, the sum begins in year k and is
discounted to that same year k. The net tax payments of the people born after year t
will also have to be discounted to year t, as it can be seen in Eq. 1.
One of the crucial assumptions in generational accounting is that the behavior of
economic agents will not change, and that fiscal policy is stable. In other words,
generational accounting provides us with some insights regarding the fiscal burdens
that fall upon current and future generations, if the current fiscal policy is maintained.
With this assumption, it is possible to calculate the age profile of the expected average
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taxes paid and transfers received per capita for the future, starting from the age profile
of payments of the base year:
hs,k,i = ht,t−(s−k),i(1 + g)s−t (4)
Basically, Eq. 4 states that the taxes paid and transfers received of a person in
year s (given s > k), with an age of s – k, will be the same as those observed for
people of the same age in year t, and adjusted for the gains in productivity between
year s and the base year. These gains in productivity are given by the annual growth
rate of productivity (g), which we will assume to be constant. For the future values
of net public expenditures, we will also assume that they evolve at the same rate as
taxes and transfers included in the net tax payments, that is, G grows at the rate of
productivity, given by g, for future years.
Since we know the government’s net wealth Wgt , and we can determine the sum
of the generational accounts of current generations and the present value of the sum
of net public expenses, we can use them to determine the sum of the generational
accounts of future generations, as a residual. More specifically:
∞∑
k=t+1
Nt,k(1 + r)−(k−t) =
∞∑
s=t




Thus, the fiscal burden that will fall upon future generations is the part of the sum
of present value of the net public expenditures that are not covered by government
net wealth and by the net tax payments of current generations. With this information,
even though we are not able to explain exactly how this fiscal burden that is left to
the future generations is going to be distributed among them, if we assume that the
average net tax payments per capita of the future generations increases by a fixed
growth rate of productivity, we can actually estimate the average per capita present
value lifetime net tax payments for the people of each future generation (making
lifetime net tax payments a fixed share of lifetime income). Hence, we define the
generational account of a representative agent born in year k and still living at time t




Ti,kPi,k(1 + r)−(i−t)/Pt,k (6)





Finally, we need to determine the generational accounts of a representative agent












Pk,0((1 + g)/(1 + r))(k−t−1)
(8)
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This equation (which is a rewrite of Eq. 5) gives us the part of net government
expenses that is not financed by current generations, which is then allocated equally
to be covered by future generations.
But we need to take into account that the expected remaining years of life of people
who are still alive, at year t (given by k + D – t), is different according to the year that
each person was born. Therefore, the per capita generational accounts are not directly
comparable among themselves. However, we can compare the per capita generational
accounts of the people born in the base year (GACURRt,t ), and a representative agent
of the future generation (GAft+1), since both take into account the net tax payments
over their entire lifetimes and are discounted back to the base year. We can also use











However, as described in Bonin and Patxot (2004), there are some drawbacks to the
indicators we are using: 1 – Ignoring the aging process of future generations. These
indicators only take into account the population levels of current generations and
future newborns; 2 – Difficulties in reflecting the effects of potential solutions (ex:
increase in labor force participation; or structural restrictions on future net taxes); 3
– Difficulties in the prediction of the impact of corrective policies in demographic
groups with different payment structures; 4 – Both are measured in current genera-
tional account terms, and a high value could just mean a low value of the denominator
(generational accounts of current newborns) instead of a serious fiscal imbalance. In
light of these shortcomings, we resort to the sustainability gap indicator, described in













This will allow us to take into account the population levels and payment struc-
tures of future generations. Instead of calculating the generational accounts for future
generations as a residual, we calculate them in the same way we calculate for cur-
rent generations, assuming that current fiscal policy is maintained. Therefore, if the
sustainability gap is positive, it indicates that current fiscal policy is not sustainable,
and there is a need to readjust net tax payments or government expenditures. How-
ever, it is difficult to interpret the size of the sustainability gap, due to the lack of
a benchmark. Bonin and Patxot (2004) point out a solution that is usually tried out,
which consists of using current GDP as a benchmark, similar to a debt-to-GDP ratio.
The obvious problem is the short-sightedness of this indicator, which collides with
the long term view of the generational account method. To solve this problem, the
authors propose to use the present value of the aggregate future yearly GDP, instead
of just current GDP. Recall that we assume that productivity grows at a constant rate
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(g), which we use to estimate the future values of GDP. This measure will give us the
% by which the deficit must be reduced each year, in terms of GDP.
However, Bonin and Patxot (2004) explain that the sustainability gap indicators
are dependent on the structure of the government budget and the age specific micro-
profiles, and are not fully comparable between countries and different periods of
time. In his earlier work, Bonin (2001), he proposes an indicator that is neutral to










This indicator reflects a flat tax on each person, in each year, adjusted in terms of
productivity growth and present value, needed to achieve fiscal sustainability. With
the denominator, we are, not only, taking into account the population levels, but also,
making the necessary corrective measure neutral in terms of life expectancy. How-
ever, the authors point out that this indicator ignores variations in gross income. We
can conclude that each indicator has its own advantages and disadvantages, so we
should rely on more than one of them to take conclusions.
4.3 Theoretical limitations of generational accounting
According to Raffelhüschen and Walliser (1999), the two main criticisms regarding
the theoretical framework behind generational accounting are: 1 – the validity of
the underlying life-cycle hypothesis (which impacts consumption patterns); 2 – the
underlying incidence assumptions.
4.3.1 Life-cycle hypothesis
The neoclassical theory establishes that agents are rational and, therefore, plan their
consumption and savings behavior throughout the life-cycle, right at the beginning
of their planning horizon, taking into account all the relevant information and the
expected lifetime resources available to them, given by the present value of future
income. As long as this present value does not change, agents will not alter their con-
sumption behavior, even if the exact intertemporal distribution of income changes.
This conclusion implies that the timing of taxes and transfers is irrelevant, as long
as they are appropriately discounted (according to the discount factor) relatively to
the period they are paid/received. However, there are three main criticisms regard-
ing this theory: 1 - altruism (that is, a private-level intergenerational redistribution
as described in Barro (1974)); 2 - agents may be myopic; 3 - or they may face liq-
uidity constraints (as stated by Buiter (1995) or Diamond (1996)). Altruism implies
that one’s generation well-being is positively impacted by the well-being of other
generations, leading to intergenerational transfers. However, these private intergen-
erational transfers are not taken into consideration by generational accounts. It may
be the case that, for this reason, in case of imbalance, generational accounts overesti-
mates the burden left to future generations (if we assume that these private transfers
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are more likely to come from current generations in favor of future generations, like
education). Regarding Buiter’s criticisms, on one hand, if agents are myopic, they
would give more importance to income and consumption in the short run than what
the life-cycle model predicts, or they would not be able to incorporate all the rele-
vant information and plan their consumption as well as in the life-cycle model. On
the other hand, even if agents are not myopic, but they face liquidity constraints, they
would not be able to distribute their income over their life-cycle (or, at least, not
as freely as without the constraints). Either one (or both) of these problems would
imply that the timing of taxes and transfers will affect the agents’ utility. Overall, the
empirical evidence suggest that both altruism (as seen in Altonji et al. (1992)) and
liquidity constraints in the long run (as described in Hayashi (1987)) don’t have a
significant effect in questioning the validity of generational accounts. However, Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) (1995) found significant evidence that agents give
more importance to current income and less to lifetime income than the life-cycle
model predicts, implying, indeed, that the myopic criticism is corroborated by the
data.
4.3.2 Incidence assumptions
Regarding the concerns about the incidence assumptions, as we stated before, it is
assumed that tax payments and transfer benefits are borne by those who formally pay
or receive them, and that a change in the taxes or transfers will not have an impact on
the choices of consumers and/or investors. However, as described in Buiter (1997),
this may not be the case. For example, an increase in taxes on labor income might
be partially shifted to firms. From a partial equilibrium analysis, the burden of the
tax (and the correspondent deadweight loss) will depend on the elasticity of supply
and demand on the labor market. For the tax to fall completely upon workers, and
for there not to be any deadweight loss, labor supply would have to be completely
inelastic. Even though estimating the demand and supply elasticity’s seems to solve
this problem, we also have to take into account the possibility of the effects of a
change in taxes on a specific market affecting other markets as well. In our exam-
ple of an increase in labor income taxes, the cost of the wage for the firm increases,
which will likely increase output prices as well. This effect will have a higher impact
on labor intensive goods. Also, this tax will lead to a rearranging of the optimal
combination of factors of production, with the goal of minimizing costs, given that
this will decrease the relative price of factors of production that can be used as a
substitute for labor. Buiter (1997) also argues that generational accounting may not
take into account the changes on the side of the consumer, specifically, that con-
sumers will simply change to less taxed substitute goods or services. Nevertheless,
Fehr and Kotlikoff (1997) have attempted to analyze to what extent the incorpora-
tion of macroeconomic feedback effects may change the notion of intergenerational
redistribution as measured by generational accounts based on simple incidence
assumptions, and they conclude that generational accounts provide fairly good
approximations.
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5 Data analysis
The empirical evaluation of the intertemporal budget constraint requires: projections
of population, taxes, transfers, and government expenditures; an initial value of gov-
ernment wealth; a growth rate and a discount rate. We consider the impact of total,
not just national, government. We establish 2010 as the base year, and consider a 100
years range of analysis, that is, from 2010 to 2110. It is important to understand that
the choice of the base year does not imply that the information on the several vari-
ables will only be taken into account until that respective year. For example, even
though we define the base year as 2010, we take into account in the calculations all
the information for government budgets after 2010 and until the last year available.
The choice of the base year yields 2 purposes: 1 – split between current generations
(people born before or during the base year) and future generations (people born
after the base year); 2 – all future values of the variables that have an impact on the
generational accounts will be discounted until the base year.
5.1 Population
Since generational accounts are defined as per capita net taxes in present terms, the
values are influenced by the size and age of the population in each generation. The
size of the population is relevant in order to distribute the amount of net taxes needed
to cover government expenditures and to service the debt. Since the size of future
generations is expected to decrease in the coming years, the total amount of net taxes
are going to be divided by a smaller number of people. In addition, the structure of
the population critically influences the absolute amount of net taxes, since most taxes
paid and transfers received are age-specific or highly related to the person’s age. The
projections used to compute the generational accounts are based on the 2009 popu-
lation projection estimates by age and gender provided by INE (Instituto Nacional
de Estatı́stica) from 2010, which is the base year, until 2060. These estimates pro-
vide four different scenarios (central, low, high and without migration), which are
described in Table 4.
For each of these scenarios, the initial values (of 2008) are identical, but they
incorporate different hypothesis regarding future values of fertility, mortality and
Table 4 Population Projections in Portugal, by Scenario
Scenario/hypothesis Fertility Index Life Expectancy at birth Migration
Low Pessimist Moderate Low
Central Moderate Moderate Moderate
High Optimist Optimist High
Without migration Moderate Moderate No migration
Source: INE, “Projecções de População Residente em Portugal”, 2009
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migration rates. Regarding the projections for net migration, they are always pos-
itive. They display a linear trend (significantly increasing for the high and central
hypothesis, and slightly decreasing for the low hypothesis) from 2007 until 2018, and
they remain constant for the rest of the period in analysis. Since we consider these
migration scenarios questionable (and the hypothesis for the other two variables are
“moderate”), we decided to use the scenario without migration for population pro-
jections by age and gender from 2010 until 2060. Given that we are aiming for a 100
year period analysis, we made our own calculations to extend the population projec-
tions to 2110. For that, we needed to estimate the number of people who would be
born each year, as well as the number of people who would die each year, for each
age group, from 2061 to 2110. Hence, we calculate birth rates and age specific death
rates (ASDR) for the 2010-2060 period, by year, gender and age. Then, we used
these rates to estimate a trend function for each age group, and used this function to
estimate the birth rates and age specific death rates from 2061 until 2110.
5.2 Fiscal data
The information regarding government revenues and expenditures was retrieved from
the DGO (Direção-Geral do Orçamento), more specifically, from the consolidated
general government accounts (public account basis) presented in the CGE reports
(Conta Geral do Estado) for the years available (2010 to 2019). For the years after
these reports, as mentioned before, it is assumed that government’s revenues and
expenditures that do not depend on demographics (the ones included in variable G)
evolve at the rate of productivity, given by g. In other cases, we break the purchases
down into age-specific components (e.g.: Expenditures with current transfers, mostly
consisting of pension benefits) and assume that each component remains constant
per member of the relevant population, adjusted for the overall growth in productiv-
ity g. This causes different components of government purchases to grow more or
less rapidly than productivity, according to whether the relevant population grows or
shrinks as a share of the overall population.
Finally, since we are considering a finite period of 100 years, we will not assume
that the government’s net debt has to be fully paid by current or future generations
until the last period considered in the analysis. Instead, we will consider that the
generations will have to “service” the debt, and assume that it grows less quickly
than the rate of discount, as to not become explosive. Therefore, in our calculations,
we have assumed that the variable Wgt is equal to zero, and the interest payments on
public debt were included in the variable Gs , hence, growing at the same rate.
5.3 Micro-profiles
The general rule regarding tax incidence is to assume that taxes are paid by accord-
ing to the base on which they fall upon: income taxes on income, consumption taxes
on consumers, and so forth. In small open economies (like Portugal), there is a need
to modify generational accounting by allocating changes in corporate capital income
taxes to generations in proportion to their labor income. The reason is that an increase
in the corporate income tax rate in a small open economy will produce an immediate
Generational Accounting in Portugal
capital outflow, thereby lowering the marginal product of labor and the wage; i.e., the
corporate tax will be immediately shifted to workers. As we established in the previ-
ous section, the categories of taxes and transfers are set according to the consolidated
general government accounts (public account basis) presented in the CGE (Conta
Geral do Estado) of each year that are available. The taxes and transfers are then allo-
cated according to income, transfer and consumption micro-profiles, estimated from
the survey Inquérito às Despesas das Famı́lias from 2010/2011. Direct taxes were
distributed based on a wage earnings profile (which is grossed up to include prop-
erty income and self-employment earnings), as well as corporate income taxes. Since
social security contributions are imposed as employment taxes, they were also dis-
tributed according to the wage profile. Indirect taxes (which mainly consist of taxes
on consumption) were distributed according to a consumption expenditures profile.
Expenditures with current transfers (consisting of social security and other transfers),
were distributed according to a general transfers receipt (which consist of pensions
and other transfers). As a general rule, the profiles obtained from the microdata are
assumed to stay constant over the entire projection period. This procedure main-
tains base-year economic structures indefinitely. We have made the calculations and
computed the micro-profiles following the same methodology used to compute the
generational accounts of Portugal in 1995, provided in Auerbach et al. (1999a), for
comparability reasons. We will later compare our calculations for the micro-profiles
with those obtained by the European National Transfer Accounts, for 2010, using an
alternative methodology.1
5.4 Growth and discount rates
It is necessary to specify an appropriate annual rate of productivity growth, since it
will influence the projections of future values of age-specific tax payments and trans-
fers, and an appropriate discount rate, in order to discount all future payments and
be able to express them in present value terms of the base year. Despite there being a
lot of uncertainty surrounding the definition of both the discount rate and the future
productivity growth rate, the appropriate discount rate is mainly influenced by the
inflation rate, while the appropriate growth rate is mainly influenced by the EU aver-
age and the country’s own economic outlook in the future. Starting with the discount
rate, recall that it is used simply for discounting all future values (revenues and expen-
ditures), in order to express them in present value terms. Therefore, it would make
sense to use the inflation rate as a proxy for the choice of this rate, since the infla-
tion rate discounts the value of the currency for future periods, in terms of purchasing
power. The inflation rate reflects the increase in the average price level of the goods
and services of an economy overtime. It implies that, as the prices increase, so do
the revenues of firms and, as a result, the tax base for collection of public resources.
It also implies all future values have to be discounted by the inflation rate, in order
to reflect the decrease in purchasing power in future years for the same amount of
1For more information on European National Transfer Accounts 2010, see: http://dataexplorer.
wittgensteincentre.org/nta/
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money. This discount follows the same reasoning as the discount rate. On the other
hand, the economic growth rate is likely to be influenced both by country’s own eco-
nomic conditions, and the economic outlook of the European countries. In the case
of Portugal, the country’s inability to finance itself at sustainable interest rates led to
the need of a financial assistance program signed in 2011, and even though it is now
able to finance itself at reasonable interest rates, the large deviations in the interest
rate over the last decade generate uncertainty regarding the country’s capacity to keep
financing itself at the current rates in the long run. This also had an impact on the
prospects of the future productivity growth rate, given that the corrective measures
applied during these years to reduce government deficits and stabilize public debt
had a negative impact on economic growth, and since these corrective policies have
to be maintained for future years in order to generate public surpluses and decrease
public debt. Furthermore, the growth rates of European countries have been relatively
modest, and Portugal is likely to accompany that tendency. Given the sensitivity of
generational accounts with respect to the values of these rates, and, as we pointed
above, the uncertainty surrounding the definition of appropriate discount and pro-
ductivity rates, it remains a standard practice to estimate generational accounts for
a range of discount rates and productivity growth rates. Also, it seems that the dis-
count rates can be more volatile in comparison to the economic growth rate. Hence,
we define six discount rates and three productivity growth rates, based on Portugal’s
own expected interest and growth rates for different possible scenarios, provided in
Table 5. We have also established an additional scenario, in which the variable Gs
grows at a rate of 0,8%. The results from these scenarios will be further discussed in
Section 7.
6 Results
6.1 Main indicators and Comparisons
In this section, we start by making a brief analysis of the net tax payments in 2010,
by age. As we can see in Fig. 7, the set of accounts exhibits a concave pattern with
respect to age. When people are young, they receive transfers (e.g., child benefits
or educational allowances) and pay consumption taxes. During their working lives,
they continue to pay consumption taxes but also pay taxes on their labor and capital
income in the form of personal income taxes and payroll taxes, so we can see that
their net tax payments increase. When workers reach older ages, they start receiving
transfer receipts (e.g., pensions), and so the net tax payments start to decline. From
Table 5 List of productivity
growth rates (g) and discount
rates (r)
r = 0% r = 1% r = 2% r = 3% r = 5% r = 7%
g = 1% g = 1% g = 1% g = 1% g = 1% g = 1%
g = 1.5% g = 1.5% g = 1.5% g = 1.5% g = 1.5% g = 1.5%
g = 2% g = 2% g = 2% g = 2% g = 2% g = 2%
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Fig. 7 Portugal’s Net Tax Payments in 2010, in millions of dollars, by age. Source: Own calculations
60 onwards, we can see that transfer payments received generally start to exceed
the tax payments so that net tax payments become negative, that is, they become
net transfers. We can also see that the absolute amount of net transfers’ declines
from 75 onwards, due to a decrease in the population levels. However, one would
not expect the net tax payments to be positive for younger generations. This has to
do with the distribution of indirect taxes by age, which are allocated according to a
micro-profile of consumption expenditures. Since the data provided the expenditures
by households, and we needed to allocate them to individuals, we resorted to an
equivalence scale defined as “OECD-modified scale”, which assigns a value of 1
to the household head, of 0,5 to each additional adult member, and of 0,3 to each
person with less than 18 years old. And given our results, even in the case when
education expenditures are allocated as transfers, the consumption taxes outweigh
them, resulting in positive net tax payments.
As an alternative, in Fig. 8, we provide the same standard scenario, but without
allocating the consumption expenditures to people with less than 18 years old. In this
case, the net tax payments of minors will converge to 0, and start increasing at the
age of 16. Although we could consider this scenario more realistic (in the sense that
the resources from the consumption expenditures are provided by older generations),
it has the downside of the consumption expenditures (and corresponding indirect tax
revenues) being concentrated on older generations. This would imply that, if there is
a decrease of the number of younger people, that would not have an impact on con-
sumption and indirect taxes. However, this may not be the case. Even if the resources
are provided by the older generations, they are spent on consumption for younger
generations. As a result, if there is a decrease of younger generations, the spending
on consumption for them will decrease, and so will the indirect taxes.
We proceed by comparing the Net Tax Payments in 2010 from our calculations
with those obtained using the data from the European National Transfer Accounts
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Fig. 8 Net Tax Payments with no underage taxes in 2010, in millions of dollars, by age. Source: Own
calculations
(Figs. 9 and 10). The first breaks down the several components of the Net Tax Pay-
ments into the different categories, and shows how they differ according to age, while
the second figure combines all of them into the total of the Net Tax Payments. The
categories that compose the Net Tax Payments in this methodology are the following:
Labour Income “YL”; Asset Income “YA”; Private Consumption “CF”; Public con-
sumption “CG”; Net Private Transfers “TF”; Net Public Transfers “TG”; and Savings
“S”. Figure 9 is constructed with the data provided by the European National Transfer
Accounts, and we construct the overall accounts for Fig. 10 with our own calcula-
tions, using that data. Essentially, we consider that all income obtained (either from
Fig. 9 Micro-profiles per capita, by age, in 2010. Source: European National Transfer Accounts, “Age
profiles”
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Fig. 10 Portugal’s Net Tax Payments of the European National Transfer Accounts in 2010, in millions of
dollars, by age. Source: Own calculations
labour or assets), has to be used for either consumption (public or private), trans-
fers (public or private), or savings. We construct the Net Tax Payments considering
a positive sign for the production or accumulation of resources (labour income, asset
income and savings), and a negative sign for the use or consumption of resources
(which consist of the remaining variables). Notice that, in Fig. 9, the negative values
for the transfers imply a transfer of resources from those generations to the gener-
ations with positive values, while consumption values are positive for all ages. We
can see that the results follow a very similar pattern to our own, exhibiting the same
concave pattern: they are lower for younger and older generations, and are higher
for working-age generations. The big difference seems to be for the younger genera-
tions: in our case, the payments are either close to zero, or slightly positive; while, in
the case using the data from the European National Transfer Accounts, the payments
are largely negative, even more than those of older generations.
There are several potential explanations for this difference: 1 – As we pointed out
before, the allocation of indirect taxes increases the payments for younger genera-
tions. In our case, the increase in consumption leads to increase in indirect taxes,
pushing the net tax payments up. In the data from European National Transfer
Accounts, consumption decreases overall resources, and, therefore, the net tax pay-
ments. Also, it takes into account that consumption of younger generations is either
partially or fully covered by working age generations; 2 – In our calculations, we are
focusing on the public aspect of the payments and expenditures (that is, on the sev-
eral variables that are likely to impact public accounts), while the European National
Transfer Accounts also takes into account the private aspect of the payments and
expenditures. As we can see from Fig. 9, private transfers are very high for younger
generations, being financed by working age generations, while being close to zero
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for older generations. This would imply that both younger and older generations are
net beneficiaries, who are financially supported by transfers from the working age
generations, who are net contributors, as we saw before. The difference is the source
of the financing. While for younger generations, the transfers are mostly private,
while for older generations, the transfers are mostly public. This reflects that, usu-
ally, younger generations are mostly financially supported by their parents, or their
families, while older generations are mostly financially supported by public entities,
whose funds are provided by working age people; 3 – Public consumption and public
transfers. If we focus on these two categories, the data from the European National
Transfer Accounts show that they are around the same levels for the younger and
older generations. However, our data from the Inquérito às Despesas das Famı́lias
and the Conta Geral do Estado (CGE) establishes higher values of public expendi-
tures for older generations than for younger generations. This reflects differences
in the data and on the allocation of household data to individuals by age. It could
also be due to some of the public expenditures in our calculations not being allo-
cated by age (recall the G variable in the first equation), and simply considered equal
amongst the different generations. However, we would argue that our data and cal-
culations make more sense, at least, for this last point. Recall that we saw in Fig. 6
that the highest government expenditure in the more recent years is, by far, with
social protection. By examining the information of this category with the Conta Geral
do Estado (CGE), it is mainly composed of retirement pensions and social security
expenditures. Evidently, these expenditures are more concentrated on older genera-
tions, and not on younger generations. As a result, it would make more sense that
most public expenditures (combination of consumption and transfers) are allocated
to older generations (while private transfers would be more concentrated on younger
generations).
Now, we follow with an analysis of the generational accounts in 2010 (see Fig. 11
and Table 6), and compare with the generational accounts in 1995 (see Fig. 12 and
Fig. 11 Generational Accounts 2010 (thousands of dollars). Source: Own calculations
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Table 6 Generational Accounts in 2010 (Standard Scenario, in thousands of dollars)
Age Income Property SS Indirect taxes Transfers Education GA
0 38,9 1,0 34,9 52,3 41,0 0,0 86,0
5 46,2 1,2 41,4 55,3 48,4 0,0 95,7
10 54,7 1,4 49,0 59,2 56,9 0,0 107,4
15 64,7 1,6 58,0 64,1 66,9 0,0 121,4
20 75,1 1,9 67,9 68,3 77,6 0,0 135,6
25 80,9 2,0 74,0 70,1 87,9 0,0 139,0
30 78,0 1,9 71,8 69,9 100,3 0,0 121,4
35 71,2 2,0 66,1 68,2 112,0 0,0 95,5
40 60,2 2,1 56,2 64,6 126,6 0,0 56,4
45 47,8 2,2 45,1 60,3 143,6 0,0 11,8
50 34,1 2,3 32,6 55,8 162,6 0,0 −37,7
55 19,5 2,4 19,1 50,1 184,5 0,0 −93,5
60 7,3 2,3 7,3 43,5 195,0 0,0 −134,5
65 1,8 2,1 1,8 36,1 180,0 0,0 −138,1
70 0,7 1,8 0,7 28,7 145,3 0,0 −113,4
75 0,5 1,7 0,4 22,3 110,5 0,0 −85,6
80 0,3 1,2 0,3 16,7 83,4 0,0 −64,9
85 0,2 0,8 0,2 11,5 58,4 0,0 −45,6
90 0,2 0,6 0,2 8,1 41,3 0,0 −32,3
95 0,1 0,4 0,1 5,8 29,9 0,0 −23,4
100+ 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,3 11,9 0,0 −9,4
Future Generations 406,2
Percentage difference 372,4
Relative indicator (π) 4,9
Source: Own calculations
Table 7).2 The tables give information on the several components of Generational
Accounts, and their corresponding values, by age: Income Taxes (+), Property Taxes
(+), Social Security Contributions (+), Indirect Taxes(+), Transfers (-), and Educa-
tion Expenditures (-). The total constitute the Generational Accounts, described in
the last column. We can see that the accounts are positive and increase initially with
age. The present value of a generation’s remaining lifetime net tax payments is gen-
erally highest for generations at the beginning or at the middle of their work spans, as
it does not include child and educational benefits received in youth, and they progress
in their working career, earning higher levels of income and, therefore, paying more
taxes. When workers reach older ages, the sum of future net tax payments tends to
decline as future transfer receipts (e.g., pensions) gain in importance compared with
2In this standard scenario, we are not treating public expenditures on education as transfer payments, and
therefore, not allocating them by age, hence their value in the Table being zero (that scenario is described
in Table 14). Instead, they are treated as government purchases and are added to the variable G, as done in
Auerbach et al. (1999a)
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Fig. 12 Generational accounts 1995 (thousands of dollars). Source: Auerbach et al. (1999a)
future tax payments. The generations that become net transfers start at 47, and then,
the absolute amount of net transfers’ declines from 65 onwards, and net tax payments
start increasing again, although, never becoming positive again. This increase hap-
pens for 2 reasons: 1 – part of the net transfer payments were prior to the base year;
2 – decrease in the population levels, as people get older.
If we compare our results with the generational accounts of Portugal in 1995,
provided in Auerbach et al. (1999a), we can see that the accounts follow a very similar
pattern, with respect to age. However, we can see that the generational accounts hit
lower values after 50 years. Comparing Figs. 11 and 12,3 in 1995, the lowest level
is between 50.000 and 100.000 dollars, while in 2010, it’s close to 150.000 dollars.
We can also see that the fiscal burden that will fall upon future generations increased
significantly. In 1995, a representative member of future generations would have to
pay 48,7% (or 1,5 times) more taxes than a representative member of the current
generation. In 2010, that value increased to an alarming 372,4% (or to 4,9).
6.2 Additional indicators and scenarios
As we established at the end of Section 4, there are some shortcomings to the indi-
cators we have calculated so far and the ones provided in Auerbach et al. (1999b).
Thus, we provide the additional indicators for 2010 in Table 8. Later on, we will see
that different indicators will be able to tell us different aspects of the accounts, or
change differently according to changes in our standard scenario.
We follow with a separate analysis of generational accounts between men and
women, which is given by Tables 12 and 13 in the appendix. The sustainability gap
indicators are a proportion of the values in Table 8. If we compare the two Tables,
we can see that the generational accounts of men are higher than those of women.
3The values in this Figure were updated according to the 1995-2010 GDP price deflator, for comparability.
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Table 7 Generational Accounts in 1995 (Standard Scenario, in thousands of dollars)
Age Income Property SS Indirect Taxes Transfers Education GA
0 17,8 3,9 21,6 36,4 17,9 0,0 61,8
5 21,0 4,5 25,6 37,1 21,1 0,0 67,1
10 24,8 5,3 30,1 37,6 24,7 0,0 73,0
15 29,1 6,3 35,4 37,9 29,0 0,0 79,6
20 33,7 7,3 41,0 37,9 33,9 0,0 86,0
25 35,5 8,3 43,1 37,6 39,3 0,0 85,1
30 33,9 8,6 41,2 36,2 45,0 0,0 75,0
35 30,9 8,5 37,5 33,8 50,7 0,0 60,0
40 26,3 7,8 32,0 30,5 56,8 0,0 39,7
45 20,9 6,8 25,4 26,7 63,9 0,0 15,9
50 14,6 5,4 17,7 22,2 70,6 0,0 −10,6
55 8,9 4,1 10,9 17,7 75,4 0,0 −33,9
60 5,0 2,8 6,1 13,7 74,6 0,0 −47,1
65 2,7 1,8 3,2 10,5 67,6 0,0 −49,4
70 1,4 1,1 1,7 8,0 54,9 0,0 −42,7
75 0,6 0,6 0,8 5,9 41,2 0,0 −33,3
80 0,0 0,4 0,0 4,0 29,3 0,0 −24,8
85 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,5 18,1 0,0 −15,4
90 0,0 0,1 0,0 0,6 4,8 0,0 −4,1
Future Generations 91,8
Percentage difference 48,7
Relative indicator (π) 1,5
Source: Auerbach et al. (1999a)
An analysis of each component that constitutes the generational accounts shows that
this difference results from: 1 - higher income taxes and social security contributions,
2 - lower transfers for men than for women. The first point can be easily explained
by the lower wages, on average, that women earn when compared to men, while the
second can, mainly, be attributed to women’s higher life expectancy.
Lastly, we provide two alternative scenarios, described in Tables 14 and 15, in the
Appendix. In the first one, we treat education expenditures as transfer payments, and
Table 8 Additional Indicators for 2010 (Standard Scenario)
Sustainability Gap (in millions of US dollars) 661.792,5
Sustainability Gap (in Portuguese GDP) 3,1
Sustainability Gap - PV of aggregate future GDP (in %) 11,3
LS – annual flat tax needed for sustainability (in US dollars) 2.390,1
Source: Own calculations
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allocate them to individuals according to their age, while in the second one, we do
the same procedure, but for health expenditures instead. While it would make sense
to allocate these expenditures by age in the standard scenario (as they are very likely
dependent on the age structure of the population), we have not done so for compara-
bility reasons with the standard scenario from the generational accounts of Portugal
in 1995, provided in Auerbach et al. (1999a). In the scenario where we allocate
education expenditures by age, this allocation has 2 opposing effects: 1 – Since edu-
cation expenditures are highly concentrated on younger generations, this allocation
pushes for an increase in their fiscal burden when compared to older generations; 2 –
The allocation of education expenditures as transfer payments will decrease the net
tax payments, but also the Gs expenditures, since these do not include education’s
expenditures in this scenario. This second effect decreases the fiscal burden left for
future generations accumulated in the Gs expenditures. If we compare the results (in
Table 14) with the standard scenario (in Table 6), we can see that the change depends
on the indicator used, that is, for some indicators, the fiscal burden for future gener-
ations increases, while, for others, it decreases. The main reason for this difference
has to do with one of the points we covered above in this section, which is the incor-
poration of the aging process for future generations. It’s important to understand that,
since we expect the ageing process of the population to get accentuated in the future,
an indicator which does not take into account the ageing process of future generations
will have a higher number of younger and working age people (as it assumes the age-
ing process will be the same as for current generations), when compared to indicators
which take into account the ageing process of future generations. As a result, a higher
number of younger and working age people in future generations implies that the Gs
expenditures will be allocated to a higher number of people and, therefore, decrease
the burden allocated to each person. Consequently, for the indicators that don’t take
into account the ageing process of future generations, the first effect dominates, and
the fiscal burden for future generations increases, while, for indicators that take into
account the ageing process of future generations, the second effects dominates, and
the fiscal burden for future generations decreases. For the second case (in Table 15),
the allocation of health expenditures by age leads to an increase of the fiscal burden
for future generations, as expected. Since these expenditures are more concentrated
on older generations, combined with the ageing of the population (wether for current




As we stated in Section 5.4 of this paper, generational accounts are highly sensitive to the
values of the discount rate and the productivity growth rate. Therefore, in addition to
our initial values (r = 5% and g = 1,5%)4 we have defined two additional discount
4Again, we define the same values for the standard scenario of Auerbach et al. (1999a)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rates (r = 3% and r = 7%) and two additional productivity growth rates (g = 1% and
g = 2%). The results can be seen in Table 9. For a given productivity growth rate, a
higher discount rate will decrease the generational accounts of both the current and
future generations. Since generational accounts are expressed in present value terms,
it makes sense that they are lower the higher the rate at which they are discounted. In
relative terms, the burden for the future generations increases with a higher discount
rate. Given that Portugal has a high pressure on its public finances, which would
require future generations to make higher net tax payments than current generations,
a higher discount rate would decrease the present value of these net tax payments,
and, therefore, increase the fiscal burden for future generations. However, notice that
the sustainability gap indicators decrease with an increase in the discount rate. Recall
that, for these indicators, we are calculating the net tax payments of future genera-
tions assuming current fiscal policy is maintained. Under the current fiscal policy,
the combination of transfers, interests and government consumption is higher than
tax payments, resulting in public deficits each year. With a higher discount rate, the
present value for the future deficits will be lower. Given that the sustainability gap
indicators are a variation of the present value of the cumulative of these deficits, they
will decrease with a higher discount rate.
For a given discount rate, the overall indicators show an increase of the fiscal bur-
den for future generations, given an increase in the productivity growth rate. Since
transfers and government consumption is higher than tax payments, and all these
variables grow at the same constant productivity rate, it is expected that the gap
between current and future generations would increase with productivity growth.
However, one could argue that, instead of these variables growing with productiv-
ity growth, they should grow at different rates. It is highly unlikely that, with higher
economic growth, governments would accelerate public consumption continuously,
putting an increasing pressure on the country’s finances and rise its default risk. It
is much more likely that the country would take the opportunity to improve public
finances, either through lower spending, or, at least, spending growth at a lower rate.
Hence, we have provided an additional scenario, described in Table 10. For this case,
we have government consumption growing at a smaller rate than taxes and transfers
(more specifically, they grow at a rate of g = 0,8%). Now, for a given discount rate,
the overall indicators decrease when the productivity growth rate increases. A higher
productivity growth will increase the value of taxes and transfers, and, therefore,
widen the gap between net tax payments/net transfers and government consumption.
Even when taking into account the aging structure of future generations (through the
sustainability gap indicators), we see that overall net tax payments increase. In con-
clusion, higher productivity rates will decrease the fiscal burden of future generations
if most of net tax payments are positive, and there is higher pressure from government
consumption.
In the scenarios so far, the discount rate is always above the productivity growth
rate. For that reason, we provide additional scenarios on Table 11, with discount
rates closer to or lower than the productivity growth rate. The first thing we notice
right away is that, in some cases, we have negative generational accounts. If we
look carefully, we can see that this happens when the discount rate is lower than
the productivity growth rate. As we saw for Table 9, this is a reflection of higher
expenditures than revenues, and a discount rate lower than the productivity growth
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rate implies that the future values will be higher than the current values, as they
grow more than they are discounted. Not only that, the further into the future, the
higher the present value will be. We can also see that the relative indicators (the Dif-
ference and π indicators) for these cases give odd results, with lower burdens for
future generations when the accounts for current and future show otherwise. This
is simply because the negative sign for the current generations distorts the calcula-
tions for these indicators. The other indicators seem to yield the same reasoning we
made in Table 9. Given that we can establish the discount rate as a proxy for the
inflation rate, and the reasoning we used for Table 10, the main conclusion we can
take from Tables 9, 10 and 11 is that a lower productivity growth rate and a lower
inflation rate will increase the fiscal burden for future generations. A higher pro-
ductivity growth rate implies the economy will be producing more resources, and
a higher tax base from which the country is able to collect public revenues from.
Given the high level of public expenditures compared to public revenues, a higher
inflation rate would decrease the present value of future deficits. Another way to
interpret it is that a higher inflation rate will increase overall resources for the econ-
omy, therefore also increasing public resources, making it easier to cover public
expenditures.
7.2 Empirical limitations
Many of the empirical objections are related to the assumptions regarding the projec-
tions of the variables, not only for the population, but mainly, regarding our economic
variables. Haveman (1994) begins his argument by pointing out the underlying
assumption that current government behavior is static. Basically, with the exception
of demographic influences, we are assuming that no other fundamental changes in
the economy occur (or that they change at the same constant rate), and therefore,
we are perpetuating the current fiscal policy indefinitely. The author argues that this
assumption is not likely to hold, given that government policies tend to be reactive,
and that fiscal policy will change in case of accumulation of excessive expenditures.
And as a result, it is likely that the actual outcomes will be very different from the
projections. Also, the assumption implies that only future generations will bear the
fiscal burden of the necessary adjustments.
However, as we established in Section 4.1, the goals of generational accounting
is to access the magnitude of the fiscal burden being left to future generations, and
what corrective policies have to be put into place, if the current policy is maintained.
Nevertheless, even population projections, which do not assume that population size
and structure are maintained, are subject to errors, as it may be the case of some stud-
ies that underestimate life expectancy and old age dependency ratios (see Balassone
et al. (2009), regarding the projection of the Working Group on Ageing Population
(AWG) of the EU’s Economic Policy Committee).
Finally, another serious concern revolves around both the future growth rates and
the discount rates, not only, regarding the sensitivity of the results to the values of
these rates, but also the ambiguity of the choice of these rates, and the fact that
they remain constant throughout the analysis window. This constant rate assump-
tion implies that the micro-profiles remain constant, that taxes and transfers are only
adjusted through demographic changes and that risk is identical for all generations,
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and remains constant over their life cycle. Also, the choice of these rates remains a
difficult decision, due to the difficulty in accessing the average future growth rate of
the economy (g), and also the accurate risk incorporated in the discount rate r (not
only there is wide range of interest rates, but it is likely that there are differences in
terms of risk for the different variables. For instance, taxes and transfers have a higher
risk, given the demographic uncertainty, when compared to government expendi-
tures). As seen in Section 7, we addressed this problem by defining alternative values
for these rates.
8 Conclusion
Developed economies are being afflicted by slowing economic growth and pop-
ulation ageing. These factors will put more pressure on public finances and on
future generations, and could, ultimately, generate an unsustainable situation. Due to
their short-sightedness and arbitrary nature, current measures of fiscal sustainability,
specifically, deficit and debt accounting, are not able to provide an accurate picture
of the effects of fiscal policies.
Hence, we resort to generational accounting, which is based on the government
intertemporal budget constraint. It reflects a “zero-sum” characteristic, in which the
debt, current and future public expenditures will have to be covered through net tax
payments of the current or future generations. For a given time profile of public
expenditures, the less current generations pay, the higher the bill left for future gen-
erations. We take this approach and apply it for Portugal, and compare the results
with those described for the Portuguese case in “Generational Accounting around the
World” by Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Willi Leibfritz, published in
1999. Even though the shape of the overall generational accounts remains the same,
there is an increase in the overall value of the accounts, which reflects the increase of
government’s weight in the economy, but more importantly, there is a large increase
of the fiscal burden for future generations. More specifically, a representative mem-
ber of future generations would have to pay 372,4% more taxes than a representative
member of the current generation. Or a flat tax of 2.390,1 dollars would have to
be paid by each person, in each year, adjusted in terms of productivity growth and
present value, to achieve fiscal sustainability.
Even though this approach is based on the long term effects of current fiscal policy,
and does not incorporate potential changes in fiscal policies in the short-term, these
results describe the magnitude of the fiscal burden being left to future generations,
as well as the extent of necessary corrective policies needed to achieve generational
balance. Generational accounting’s fundamental message is that who pays the gov-
ernment’s bills is a zero-sum game. The less those now alive pay, the larger the
amounts their descendants will pay. Delaying not only makes the situation worse, it
also leaves everyone in society uncertain about how long-term fiscal imbalances will
ultimately be resolved.
The fact that many international organizations, like the IMF and the OECD, are
showing concerns and trying to raise awareness for fiscal unsustainability and inter-
generational inequality, not only for Portugal, but many developed countries as well,
should be enough of a warning to take action on these issues in the coming years.
With stronger global economic growth, a more expansionary monetary policy by the
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ECB, the economic recovery in Europe, and the economic recovery and a return of
Portugal to short to medium term of fiscal sustainability, we have an opportunity
to take action and make the difficult choices that we have to make, under a more
favorable context, instead of delaying the inevitable.
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Appendix
Table 12 Generational Accounts in 2010 (Men, Standard Scenario, in thousands of dollars)
Age Income Property SS Indirect taxes Transfers Education GA
0 45,1 0,9 40,5 56,0 43,7 0,0 98,9
5 53,7 1,1 48,1 59,9 52,3 0,0 110,6
10 63,5 1,3 56,9 64,4 59,8 0,0 126,2
15 75,1 1,5 67,3 70,6 71,9 0,0 142,6
20 87,3 1,7 78,9 75,9 83,0 0,0 160,8
25 94,8 1,8 86,7 79,0 92,6 0,0 169,8
30 92,8 2,0 85,3 80,5 107,7 0,0 153,0
35 87,1 2,2 80,7 80,2 122,2 0,0 128,1
40 74,2 2,3 69,3 76,1 139,3 0,0 82,7
45 59,4 2,4 55,8 71,0 158,2 0,0 30,4
50 43,1 2,7 41,2 66,0 182,3 0,0 −29,3
55 25,2 2,7 24,6 58,8 207,7 0,0 −96,4
60 9,9 2,7 9,9 50,4 225,2 0,0 −152,3
65 3,0 2,1 3,0 41,0 207,8 0,0 −158,7
70 1,2 1,7 1,1 31,3 160,3 0,0 −125,0
75 0,8 1,5 0,8 23,1 115,5 0,0 −89,3
80 0,6 1,1 0,6 17,2 86,6 0,0 −67,2
85 0,4 0,7 0,4 11,7 59,8 0,0 −46,5
90 0,3 0,5 0,3 8,2 42,4 0,0 −33,1
95 0,2 0,4 0,2 6,0 31,2 0,0 −24,4
100+ 0,1 0,2 0,1 2,6 13,8 0,0 −10,9
Future Generations 309,7
Percentage difference 213,2







Table 13 Generational Accounts in 2010 (Women, Standard Scenario, in thousands of dollars)
Age Income Property SS Indirect Taxes Transfers Education GA
0 32,8 1,1 29,4 48,4 38,5 0,0 73,2
5 39,0 1,3 35,0 51,0 45,9 0,0 80,3
10 46,2 1,5 41,4 53,8 53,2 0,0 89,7
15 54,7 1,8 49,1 58,0 64,5 0,0 99,2
20 63,5 2,0 57,4 61,2 73,9 0,0 110,2
25 67,6 2,0 62,0 61,1 82,7 0,0 110,0
30 64,0 1,9 59,2 60,0 95,1 0,0 90,0
35 56,4 1,7 52,5 57,0 104,6 0,0 63,1
40 47,2 1,8 44,0 53,9 116,8 0,0 30,0
45 37,1 1,9 35,1 50,5 132,0 0,0 −7,2
50 25,9 2,0 24,7 46,6 146,7 0,0 −47,5
55 14,3 2,1 14,1 42,3 165,7 0,0 −93,0
60 4,8 2,0 4,9 37,4 170,6 0,0 −121,5
65 0,9 2,1 0,9 32,2 158,3 0,0 −122,2
70 0,4 1,9 0,4 26,4 132,7 0,0 −103,7
75 0,2 1,8 0,1 21,2 104,9 0,0 −81,6
80 0,1 1,3 0,1 15,8 78,9 0,0 −61,5
85 0,1 0,9 0,1 10,9 55,0 0,0 −43,1
90 0,1 0,6 0,1 7,5 38,4 0,0 −30,2
95 0,0 0,4 0,0 5,3 27,3 0,0 −21,5
100+ 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,0 10,6 0,0 −8,4
Future Generations 508,6
Percentage difference 594,7
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Table 14 Generational Accounts in 2010 (Education as transfer, in thousands of dollars)
Age Income Property SS Indirect taxes Transfers Education GA
0 38,9 1,0 34,9 52,3 41,0 20,4 65,5
5 46,2 1,2 41,4 55,3 48,4 20,1 75,5
10 54,7 1,4 49,0 59,2 56,9 20,3 87,1
15 64,7 1,6 58,0 64,1 66,9 21,1 100,3
20 75,1 1,9 67,9 68,3 77,6 21,6 114,0
25 80,9 2,0 74,0 70,1 87,9 20,3 118,7
30 78,0 1,9 71,8 69,9 100,3 21,2 100,2
35 71,2 2,0 66,1 68,2 112,0 21,2 74,3
40 60,2 2,1 56,2 64,6 126,6 18,1 38,3
45 47,8 2,2 45,1 60,3 143,6 13,5 −1,7
50 34,1 2,3 32,6 55,8 162,6 9,3 −47,0
55 19,5 2,4 19,1 50,1 184,5 5,6 −99,1
60 7,3 2,3 7,3 43,5 195,0 3,5 −138,0
65 1,8 2,1 1,8 36,1 180,0 2,5 −140,6
70 0,7 1,8 0,7 28,7 145,3 1,5 −114,9
75 0,5 1,7 0,4 22,3 110,5 1,2 −86,9
80 0,3 1,2 0,3 16,7 83,4 1,0 −65,8
85 0,2 0,8 0,2 11,5 58,4 0,7 −46,2
90 0,2 0,6 0,2 8,1 41,3 0,5 −32,8
95 0,1 0,4 0,1 5,8 29,9 0,4 −23,8
100+ 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,3 11,9 0,2 −9,6
Future Generations 367,6
Percentage difference 460,9







Table 15 Generational Accounts in 2010 (Health as transfer, in thousands of dollars)
Age Income Property SS Indirect Taxes Transfers Health GA
0 38,9 1,0 34,9 52,3 41,0 18,1 67,9
5 46,2 1,2 41,4 55,3 48,4 19,3 76,3
10 54,7 1,4 49,0 59,2 56,9 21,0 86,4
15 64,7 1,6 58,0 64,1 66,9 22,8 98,7
20 75,1 1,9 67,9 68,3 77,6 24,6 111,0
25 80,9 2,0 74,0 70,1 87,9 25,5 113,5
30 78,0 1,9 71,8 69,9 100,3 26,5 94,9
35 71,2 2,0 66,1 68,2 112,0 26,7 68,8
40 60,2 2,1 56,2 64,6 126,6 26,6 29,8
45 47,8 2,2 45,1 60,3 143,6 26,3 −14,5
50 34,1 2,3 32,6 55,8 162,6 25,5 −63,3
55 19,5 2,4 19,1 50,1 184,5 24,7 −118,2
60 7,3 2,3 7,3 43,5 195,0 22,3 −156,8
65 1,8 2,1 1,8 36,1 180,0 18,3 −156,4
70 0,7 1,8 0,7 28,7 145,3 11,6 −125,0
75 0,5 1,7 0,4 22,3 110,5 2,0 −87,6
80 0,3 1,2 0,3 16,7 83,4 1,5 −66,4
85 0,2 0,8 0,2 11,5 58,4 1,1 −46,7
90 0,2 0,6 0,2 8,1 41,3 0,8 −33,1
95 0,1 0,4 0,1 5,8 29,9 0,6 −24,0
100+ 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,3 11,9 0,2 −9,7
Future Generations 407,0
Percentage difference 499,5
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